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Abstract
We extend Antra`s and Helpman (2004) on firm heterogeneity and organizational choice to a
dynamic setting with FDI uncertainty, in which the probability of investment failure decreases
with the host country’s infrastructure level and increases with the technological complexity
facing each firm. Moreover, it decreases over time as the accumulated mass of firms succeeding
in FDI increases. We show that a minimum level of infrastructure is required to trigger a first
wave of industrial migration. We then formalize the often noted “magnet effect” of FDI–the first
wave of industrial migration generates positive externality (information spillover) for subsequent
investors, which stimulates a second wave of industrial migration. The process continues until
the power of the “magnet” reaches its steady-state level. In contrast with the predictions
in Antra`s and Helpman (2004), we show that firms with intermediate productivity levels are
the ones migrate first, while the most productive and the least productive firms tend to stay
behind. This non-monotonic relationship between firms’ productivity and their FDI propensities
is consistent with the patterns of Taiwanese firms undertaking FDI in China.
∗Tel: +65-6828-0830; fax: +65-6828-0833. E-mail address: plchang@smu.edu.sg (P.-L. Chang).
†This project was supported by the SMU research grant.
‡Tel: +886-2-2782-2791 ext 503; fax: +886-2-2785-3946 E-mail address: clu@econ.sinica.edu.tw (C.-H. Lu).
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1 Introduction
We extend the seminal paper of Antra`s and Helpman (2004) on firm productivity and organizational
choice to the setting with investment uncertainty, whereby international vertical integration is
associated with higher risk of failure than domestic vertical integration, with the risk being higher
for firms producing more technologically sophisticated products. This modification alters the basic
prediction of Antra`s and Helpman (2004) that more productive firms in a given industry are more
likely to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI). Instead, in this paper, we show that firms with
intermediate productivity levels are the first ones to migrate, while the most productive and the
least productive firms tend to stay behind. Thus, there is a non-monotonic relationship between
firm productivity and FDI propensity.
Next, we show that the migration of Northern firms to the South is not automatic. We pin
down the minimum level of infrastructure that the South must possess in order to attract the
first wave of industry migration from the North. Migrating firms’ identities as reflected by their
productivity levels are also traced out. We then formalize the often noted “magnet effect” of FDI
that international industry migration often occurs in clusters and in orders. As will be shown
in the paper, when more firms have succeeded in FDI and produced in the South, the general
investment uncertainty decreases, which lowers the FDI risk of failure. Thus, the fist wave of
industry migration generates positive externality for subsequent investors and stimulates a second
wave of industry migration, which then triggers a third wave of migration. The process of industry
migration continues until the power of the “magnet” reaches its steady-state level and an equilibrium
structure of international production emerges.
We conduct simulations to illustrate the dynamics of this magnet effect and to derive the
structure of international production at the steady state. A series of simulations are carried out to
study the effects of several key parameters on the dynamics of the migration process. This includes
the level of infrastructure in the South, the economic distance between the host and home country
of the FDI, the relative wage advantage of the South, the relative management cost disadvantage
of international versus domestic vertical integration, sectoral characteristics such as headquarter-
service intensity and demand conditions, and relative bargaining powers between the headquarter
and the supplier of intermediate inputs.
2
2 Empirical Observations
The non-monotonic relationship between firm productivity and FDI propensity is observed in a
sample of Taiwanese firms over a period of 15 years since 1991 when the Taiwanese government
lifted the ban on westward FDI in mainland China. The details are shown in Figure 1. In the
figure, the timing of the first-time FDI undertaken by a Taiwanese firm, measured as the number
of quarters elapsed since 1991, is indicated along the vertical axis, and the productivity of a firm
along the horizontal axis. Firms in six major industries are sampled, with each panel indicating
the pattern for each industry.
The firms in our sample are firms listed on either the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation or the
Over the Counter market. We compile the information on the timing of FDI for each firm based on
the Foreign Direct Investment Database published by Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank (TEJ)
and the Yearly Report published by the Investment Commissions, Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Taiwan. The productivity of a firm is measured by the ratio of Return on Assets (ROA). We take
the average of the ratios for a firm between 1991 and 1993, as an indication of a firm’s initial
productivity level. The ROA data are taken from the TEJ Financial Statement Database.
As shown in the figure, across all industries, the firms with intermediate productivity levels
tend to undertake FDI earlier than the most productive and the least productive firms. The
phenomenon is most notable in the Electronics industry, where firms are spread over a wider range
of productivity levels. This finding contradicts the conventional perception that higher-productivity
firms have a higher tendency to undertake FDI than lower-productivity firms, as captured by the
theoretical model of Antra`s and Helpman (2004) in a static setting. The panel for the Electronics
industry also suggests that the range of intermediate firms who undertake FDI expands over time,
resembling a ‘cone’. This is an interesting dynamics that a static model could not readily explain.
These observations motivate us to develop a theoretical model that accounts for the non-monotonic
relationship between firm productivity and FDI propensity, and a dynamic one that predicts the
‘cone’ dynamics of FDI.
3
3 The Model
The world has a unit measure of population with the following preference structure:
U = x0 +
1
αj
J∑
j=1
X
αj
j , 0 < αj < 1
Xj =
[∫
xj(i)αjdi
]1/αj
,
where x0 is the numeraire, homogeneous, goods produced both in the North and in the South. The
labor is the only factor of production and the production technology of x0 exhibits constant returns
to scale; thus the labor productivity of a country in producing the numeraire goods determines its
wage rate. The North is assumed to have an absolute advantage in producing the numeraire
goods, and therefore commands a higher wage: wN > wS . Xj is the aggregate consumption of
differentiated products xj(i) in sector j. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties
within a sector (σj = 11−αj ) is allowed to differ across sectors.
The derived inverse demand function for each variety i in sector j is:
pj(i) = xj(i)αj−1 (1)
Let hj(i) denote the headquarter service input and mj(i) the intermediate input used in the
production of variety i in sector j. It is assumed that only the North has the ability to produce
the headquarter service, while the intermediate input can be produced either in the North or the
South. The production technology of variety i in sector j is:
xNj (i) = θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [mj(i)
1− ηj
]1−ηj
(2)
when the intermediate input is produced in the North. The parameter ηj denotes the intensity of the
headquarter service component in the production of the final goods in sector j. The higher ηj is, the
more important is the headquarter service component. The parameter θ indicates the productivity
level of the headquarter producing the variety. We will also use this parameter to indicate the level
of technology sophistication employed to produce the product. Thus, it is assumed that a more
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productive headquarter produces a variety that embodies more sophisticated technology.
On the other hand, if the intermediate input is produced in the South, the headquarter faces a
potential risk that the intermediate input produced abroad may fail to match the exact specification
designed by the North. In this case, the output is zero. In brief, the production technology in this
case is:
xSj (i) =
 θ
[
hj(i)
ηj
]ηj [mj(i)
1−ηj
]1−ηj
, in case of success;
0, in case of failure.
The headquarter chooses between acquiring the ownership of a manufacturing plant in the
North (domestic vertical integration) or one in the South (international vertical integration). It
is assumed that the organizational fixed cost to coordinate the headquarter and the supplier of
intermediate components is higher in the case of international vertical integration than domestic
vertical integration:
fS > fN . (3)
In the following, we focus on one sector and suppress the sector index to simplify the notation.
By (1) and (2), the revenue function for variety i given the amounts of the inputs is:
Rl(i) = γlθα
[
h(i)
η
]αη [m(i)
1− η
]α(1−η)
, l = {N,S} (4)
where γN = 1, and 0 < γS < 1 is the probability of successful matching of the headquarter service
and the intermediate input produced in the South.
As the contract between the headquarter and the supplier of intermediate inputs is non-
enforceable, the two parties negotiate the division of the sales revenue ex post. The division
depends on the relative negotiating powers of the two parties and their outside options. Suppose
the negotiation fails. Given the headquarter’s ownership in the manufacturing plant, it can poten-
tially seize the intermediate component at the cost of a fraction (1−δ) of the output. Also suppose
that the headquarter is able to extract at the ex post negotiation, a fraction β of the surplus from
the contract with the supplier. Then, the division of the sales revenue for the headquarter is:
βN = βS = (δ)α + β[1− (δ)α]. (5)
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In the first stage, the headquarter and the supplier of the intermediate input determine respec-
tively how much headquarter service and intermediate input to produce, taking into account the
fraction of the sales revenue they will extract from the negotiation in the second stage. The produc-
tion of either input is assumed to have a unit labor requirement of one. With profit maximization
by both parties, the joint profit of the two parties in either of the two potential organizational forms
is:
pil(θ, η) = γl
1
1−α θ
α
1−αψl(η)− wNf l, l = {N,S}, (6)
where
ψl(η) =
1− α[βlη + (1− βl)(1− η)]
{(1/α) (wN/βl)η [wl/(1− βl)]1−η}α/(1−α)
. (7)
It can be shown that the headquarter will choose the organizational form that maximizes the above
joint profit. Given that wS < wN , it follows that ψS(η) > ψN (η). Thus, headquarters choosing
to engage FDI in the South enjoy a larger variable profit margin, but at the same time, incur a
higher fixed organizational cost. In addition, the risk of mismatch involved in FDI further reduces
the variable profit gain of producing in the South when compared to the North. We assume that
the probability of successful matching takes the following specific form:
γS(θ) =
(
b
θ
)αz
, θ ≥ b > 0, (8)
z =
1
K +XS
, K > 1, XS ≥ 0, (9)
where the parameter K represents the level of infrastructure in the South and XS the degree of
FDI penetration in the South. The level of infrastructure encompasses various aspects of a nation’s
capacity in absorbing FDI. This includes physical infrastructure, social capital, human capital, and
governance infrastructure. Equation (8) and (9) imply that the higher the level of infrastructure
and the larger the presence of FDI in the South, the higher the probability that a FDI undertaking
will succeed for a given θ. Observe that the FDI success probability is strictly decreasing in product
sophistication, θ, with the probability equal to one for the lowest-tech product and approaching
zero as the product sophistication increases toward infinity. Thus, dγS/dθ < 0, γS(b) = 1, and
limθ→∞ γS(θ) = 0.
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To simplify notation in the following exposition, define θ˜ = θ
α
1−α , and b˜ = b
α
1−α . It follows that
piS(θ˜, z) = ψS b˜z θ˜1−z − wNfS , (10)
piN (θ˜) = ψN θ˜ − wNfN . (11)
As 0 < z < 1, Equation (10) implies that the profit function of undertaking FDI is increasing and
concave in θ˜, which is in contrast with the linear profit function of producing in the North. Note
that the above setup includes Antra`s and Helpman (2004) as a special case when z approaches
zero (and the probability of successful matching approaches one for all θ). In this case, there is
no uncertainty involved in FDI and the profit function of FDI becomes a linear function in θ˜:
ψS θ˜ − wNfS .
We adopt the following assumption to avoid a taxonomy of cases.
Assumption 1 The parameters satisfy the following conditions: (i) b˜ < w
NfN
ψN
; (ii) f
N
ψN
< f
S
ψS
.
Define θ˜N ≡ wNfNψN and θ˜′ ≡ w
NfS
ψS
. Headquarters (hereafter firms) with the productivity level
θ˜N break even when producing in the North; similarly, firms with the productivity level θ˜′ break
even when producing in the South, under the scenario of no uncertainty. By Assumption 1(ii),
θ˜N < θ˜
′, and there exists θ˜S ≡ w
N (fS−fN )
ψS−ψN > θ˜
′ such that firms with the productivity level θ˜S
are indifferent between producing in the North and producing in the South, under the scenario
of no uncertainty. Together, Assumptions 1(i) and (ii) imply that the least productive firm b˜ is
below the lower threshold to produce in the North, θ˜N , which is further below the lower threshold
to produce in the South under no uncertainty, θ˜S . Thus, firms are partitioned according to their
productivity levels into the least productive ones who do not produce, the less productive ones
who produce in the North, and the most productive ones who produce in the South. There is no
complete specialization by the South in the production of intermediate components even in the best
scenario, for the South, of no FDI uncertainty. This is the benchmark scenario taken in Antra`s and
Helpman (2004) . We develop our analysis below conditional on this setup.
We start by characterizing the curve piS(θ˜, z), which is illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure,
θ˜ is indicated on the horizontal axis and piS (or piN ) on the vertical axis. Note that piS(b˜, z) =
ψS b˜ − wNfS . Thus, regardless of z, the curve piS(θ˜, z) always passes through the fixed point
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(b˜, ψS b˜ − wNfS), denoted Point A in the figure. In the limiting case where there is no FDI
uncertainty (z → 0), piS(θ˜, z) approaches a linear function with a vertical intercept of −wNfS and
a slope of ψS . For 0 < z < 1, piS(θ˜, z) is increasing and concave in θ˜. Note that piS(θ˜, z) in (10)
can be rewritten as piS(θ˜, z) = ψS θ˜ ( b˜
θ˜
)z − wNfS . Thus, piS(θ˜, z) is decreasing in z for θ˜ > b˜ and
increasing in z for θ˜ < b˜. As z increases, the curve piS(θ˜, z) shifts down for θ˜ > b˜ and shifts up
for θ˜ < b˜. As z → 1, the curve piS(θ˜, z) approaches a step function with piS = −wNfS for θ˜ = 0
and piS = ψS b˜ − wNfS for all θ˜ > 0. In contrast, piN (θ˜) is linear in θ˜, with a vertical intercept of
−wNfN and a slope of ψN . By Assumption 1, it follows that piS(b˜, z) < piN (b˜).
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique z∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the curve piS is
tangent to piN , and
(i) for all z ∈ (0, z∗), ∃ θ˜S < θ˜0 < θ˜1, such that piS(θ˜, z) > piN (θ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1), and
piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜0) ∪ (θ˜1,∞);
(ii) for all z ∈ (z∗, 1), piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
Proof of Proposition 1. Define θ˜+ such that dpi
S
dθ˜
= dpi
N
dθ˜
; that is, θ˜+ is the productivity level where
the two curves piS and piN have the same slope. It is straightforward to verify that
θ˜+ = b˜[(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]1/z.
Thus, θ˜+ ≥ b˜ if and only if z ≤ 1− ψN
ψS
≡ z¯.
(i) For 0 < z < z¯, we have the difference between the two curves at θ˜+ as
piS(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+) = z
1− z θ˜
+ψN − wN (fS − fN ).
Define φ(z) ≡ z1−z θ˜+ and g(z) ≡ 1−zz . It is straightforward to show that
dθ˜+
dz
=
d lnθ˜+
dz
θ˜+
=
{
− 1
z2
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]
− 1
z(1− z)
}
θ˜+ < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (1−z) ψS
ψN
> 1 for 0 < z < z¯. As limz→0 θ˜+ →∞
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and limz→0 g(z)→∞, by L’Hoˆpital rule,
lim
z→0
φ(z) = lim
z→0
dθ˜+/dz
dg(z)/dz
= lim
z→0
{
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]
+
z
1− z
}
θ˜+ →∞.
Thus,
lim
z→0
piS(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+)→∞.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that limz→z¯ φ(z) = z¯1−z¯ b˜ =
ψS−ψN
ψN
b˜. Therefore,
lim
z→z¯ pi
S(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+) = b˜(ψS − ψN )− wN (fS − fN ) < 0,
where the last inequality follows by Assumption 1. Finally, observe that for 0 < z < z¯,
dφ(z)
dz
= [
d lnθ˜+
dz
− d ln g(z)
dz
]φ(z)
=
{
− 1
z2
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]
− 1
z(1− z) +
1
z(1− z)
}
φ(z)
=
{
− 1
z2
ln
[
(1− z) ψ
S
ψN
]}
φ(z) < 0.
Therefore,
d
(
piS(θ˜+, z)− piN (θ˜+)
)
/dz < 0.
In summary, as z → 0, piS(θ˜, z) becomes linear, and θ˜+ → ∞. The difference between piS(θ˜, z)
and piN (θ˜) at θ˜ = θ˜+ approaches infinity. As z increases, θ˜+ decreases and the difference between
piS(θ˜+, z) and piN (θ˜+) also decreases monotonically. At z = z¯, θ˜+ = b˜ and the difference between
piS(θ˜+, z) and piN (θ˜+) becomes negative. Therefore, there must exist a unique z∗ ∈ (0, z¯) such that
piS(θ˜+, z∗)− piN (θ˜+) = 0. In other words, the curve piS(θ˜, z) is tangent to piN (θ˜) at z = z∗.
For z ∈ (0, z∗), piS(θ˜+, z)−piN (θ˜+) > 0. Thus, the curve piS(θ˜, z) must have intersected the line
piN (θ˜) twice. Label the corresponding productivity levels θ˜0 and θ˜1 with θ˜0 < θ˜1. Then it follows
from the concavity of piS(θ˜, z) that piS(θ˜, z) − piN (θ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1). Next, note that for
z > 0, the curve piS(θ˜, z) falls below the linear line ψS θ˜−wNfS , which intersects the line piN (θ˜) at
θ˜S . Thus, it must be the case that θ˜0 > θ˜S for z > 0. Moreover, because θ˜0 > θ˜N , it follows that
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piN (θ˜) > 0 for θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1). Therefore, piS(θ˜, z) > piN (θ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ (θ˜0, θ˜1), where θ˜S < θ˜0 < θ˜1.
It follows from the concavity of piS(θ˜, z) that piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜0) ∪ (θ˜1,∞).
(ii) For z∗ < z < z¯, the curve piS(θ˜, z) falls completely below the line piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
Thus, piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜) for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞).
For z¯ ≤ z < 1, θ˜+ ≤ b˜, and because dpiS
dθ˜
is decreasing in θ˜, it follows that dpi
S
dθ˜
< dpi
N
dθ˜
, for all
θ˜ > b˜. In addition, at θ˜ = b˜, piS(b˜, z) < piN (b˜) by Assumption 1. It follows that piS(θ˜, z) < piN (θ˜)
for all θ˜ ∈ [b˜,∞). The desired result in (ii) therefore follows.
Corollary 2 For z ∈ (0, z∗), firms are partitioned according to their productivity levels as follows:
(i) for firms with θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜N ], they exit the market; (ii) for firms with θ˜ ∈ [θ˜N , θ˜0] ∪ [θ˜1,∞), they
integrate the production in the North; (iii) for firms with θ˜ ∈ [θ˜0, θ˜1], they undertake FDI.
On the other hand, for z ∈ (z∗, 1), FDI is not viable: (i) for firms with θ˜ ∈ [b˜, θ˜N ], they exit the
market; (ii) for firms with θ˜ ∈ [θ˜N ,∞), they integrate the production in the North.
Proposition 3 For z ∈ (0, z∗), the range of firms undertaking FDI, as denoted by (θ˜1 − θ˜0), is
monotonically decreasing in z:
(i) as z → 0, θ˜1 − θ˜0 →∞;
(ii) as z → z∗, θ˜1 − θ˜0 → 0
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that piS(θ˜, z) is decreasing in z for a given θ˜ > b˜, so the increasing
concave curve piS(θ˜, z) shifts down as z increases for θ˜ > b˜. It follows that with a larger z < z∗,
the curve piS(θ˜, z) will intersect the line piN (θ˜) at a higher θ˜0 and at a lower θ˜1. Thus, the range of
firms undertaking FDI, θ˜1 − θ˜0, decreases, as z increases toward z∗. At z = z∗, piS(θ˜, z) becomes
tangent to piN (θ˜). It follows that θ˜0 = θ˜1. As z → 0, piS(θ˜, z) → ψS θ˜ − wNfS . It follows that
θ˜0 → θ˜S and θ˜1 →∞. The desired result therefore follows.
4 The Magnet Effect of FDI
In this section, we extend the static model introduced above to a dynamic setting with multiple
time periods. In so doing, we formalize the stylized fact that earlier FDI often reveals information
regarding the host country’s investment environment, which helps lower the uncertainty faced by
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later investors. The information spillover is assumed to be external to firms and to affect the whole
economy. Specifically, we assume that
γSt (θ) =
(
b
θ
)αzt
, θ ≥ b > 0, (12)
zt =
1
K +XSt−1
, K > 1, t = 1, 2, . . . (13)
where XSt−1 denotes the degree of FDI penetration in the South in period t−1. Equations (12) and
(13) imply that a higher degree of FDI penetration in period t − 1 raises the success probability
of FDI in period t for any given θ. Thus, earlier FDI creates a positive externality for subsequent
FDI. In particular, the degree of FDI penetration in period t is defined as the effective mass of
firms producing in the South in period t:
XSt =
G(θ1,t)−G(θ0,t)
d
, d > 0, (14)
where G(·) is the cumulative distribution function of firm productivity levels and is chosen to be
a Pareto distribution with shape k, i.e., G(θ) = 1 −
(
b
θ
)k
. In (14), the magnitude G(θ1,t) −
G(θ0,t) represents the absolute mass of firms producing in the South in period t, which is scaled
by the economic distance, d, between the host and home country of FDI. The economic distance,
d, summarizes the barriers to information exchange arising from physical distance, and cultural,
language, and institutional differences. Thus, for a given absolute mass of firms transplanted in
the South, the effective mass and the extent of information spillover it creates is larger, the closer
the two countries are in terms of their economic distance.
We now formulate the magnet effect of FDI. Begin with an initial period (t = 0) when no FDI is
present in the South (XS0 = 0). It is straightforward to identify the minimum level of infrastructure
that the South must possess to trigger the first wave of FDI. By Proposition 1, it follows that:
Corollary 4 The minimum level of infrastructure that the South must possess to trigger the first
wave of FDI is K∗ = 1/z∗.
The importance of the recipient country’s infrastructure in influencing FDI flows has been doc-
umented by various empirical contributions. See, for example, Wei (2000) for a study of corruption
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and its depressing effect on inward FDI. In another study, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) estimated
the minimum threshold of infrastructure that a recipient country must achieve to attract positive
FDI flows from the U.S., where they measured the level of infrastructure by estimating a linear
combination of proxies for governance infrastructure, human capital, and physical capital.
Let θ0,t and θ1,t indicate the lower and upper bound of productivity levels, of which firms
undertake FDI in period t. If the South possesses the minimal level of infrastructure (K > K∗), FDI
takes place at t = 1, and by Corollary 2, there exists θ0,1 < θ1,1 such that firms with θ ∈ (θ0,1, θ1,1)
undertake FDI. By (12)–(14), it follows that γS2 > γ
S
1 , given that X
S
1 > X
S
0 = 0. Thus, the first
wave of FDI helps raise the success probability of FDI at t = 2. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where
at t = 2, the curve piS tilts upward. Firms with productivity levels in the range of (θ0,1 − ², θ0,1)
or (θ1,1, θ1,1 + ²), who find it not profitable to undertake FDI at t = 1, now prefer moving the
production process to the South, since the risk associated with FDI is lower than before. As a
result, the first wave of migration induces a second wave of migration, (θ0,1, θ1,1) ⊂ (θ0,2, θ1,2),
and the effective mass of FDI firms in the South is enlarged, XS2 > X
S
1 > X
S
0 = 0. The larger mass
of FDI firms further reduce the FDI uncertainty and trigger a third wave of FDI. The process of
migration will continue until the power of the “magnet” reaches its steady-state level. The time
paths of
{
γSt
}∞
t=1
,
{
XSt
}∞
t=1
, and {(θ0,t, θ1,t)}∞t=1 can be derived accordingly by iteration.
5 Simulation
In this section, we conduct simulations to illustrate the dynamics of industry migration introduced
above. By varying the parameter values of the model, we will also obtain insights into the qualitative
effects of important parameters on the speed and range of FDI over time. We choose the following
parameter values for our benchmark case: wN = 4, wS = 1, fN = 1, fS = 2, α = 0.5, δ =
0.64, β = 0.5, η = 0.6, b = 100, K = 5, k = 1, and d = 1. Substituting them into (7), one
can derive ψN and ψS and verify that Assumption 1 holds. Following the steps discussed in the
previous section, the time paths of (θ0,t, θ1,t) can be derived iteratively given the parameter values
of the model. The result for the benchmark case is shown in the middle panel of Figure 4 and
repeated in Figures 5–13 for comparisons with alternative parameter values.
We perform a series of experiments in which we perturb the value of one parameter at a time
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with respect to the benchmark case and derive the corresponding time paths of (θ0,t, θ1,t). For each
parameter, two alternative values to the benchmark value are tried to illustrate the effects of an
increase and a decrease in the corresponding parameter value. We discuss the findings below.
The first experiment examines the effect of the level of infrastructure in the South on the
speed and range of FDI. The benchmark is perturbed with respect to the parameter K: K =
{5.25, 5, 4.75}. The results are shown in Figure 4, and they indicate that a better infrastructure
in the South attracts a wider range of intermediate firms in the first wave of industry migration,
which in turn creates a larger externality and leads to a bigger second wave of industry migration.
The result: at steady state, a wider range of intermediate firms undertake FDI in the South that
has a higher level of infrastructure. It is straightforward to see that if the level of infrastructure in
the South falls significantly below K = 4.75, the first wave of FDI will not kick off at all.
The second experiment studies the effects of the economic distance between the host and the
home country of FDI, where we vary the parameter d: d = {10, 1, 0.5}. The results are illustrated
in Figure 5. Conditional on the same level of infrastructure in the South, K, the same range of
firms undertake FDI in the first wave of industry migration. However, given the same absolute
mass of firms producing in the South in the first period, a shorter distance between the host and
the home country facilitates faster information spillover and leads to a larger subsequent wave of
industry migration. At steady state, a wider range of intermediate firms produce in the South that
is closer to the North.
Figure 6 illustrates the effects of the relative wage advantage of the South, wN , in determining
the extent of FDI. The range of variation for this parameter is: wN = {4.2, 4, 3.8}. As shown
by the figure, the higher the wage in the North relative to the South, the range of the first wave
of industry migration shifts up, and so does the steady-state range of intermediate firms located
in the South. The intuition is easier seen in the linear case where FDI incurs no risk. Recall that
the lower bound of firms who remain in the North is θ˜N ≡ wNfNψN and the lower bound of firms
who undertake FDI is θ˜S ≡ w
N (fS−fN )
ψS−ψN . It follows that θ˜S = θ˜N
fS/fN−1
ψS/ψN−1 . By Equations (5) and
(7), it can be verified that as the relative wage in the North rises, θ˜N and θ˜S both increase, but
θ˜S/θ˜N decreases. This corresponds to the higher lower bound θ0 in Figure 6 with a higher wN
for the nonlinear case. On the other hand, the upper bound θ1 is also higher with a higher wN .
This is because in the linear case, as wN increases, although both the profit lines of the South and
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of the North shifts down, the profit line of the South becomes relatively steeper compared to the
profit line of the North (ψS/ψN = wN (1−η)
α
1−α increases as wN increases). This implies that in the
nonlinear case, the concave profit curve of the South piS will intersect the profit line of the North
at a higher upper bound.
The next two experiments look at how the relative management cost disadvantage of interna-
tional vertical integration affects the extent of FDI. This is reflected by the fixed organizational cost
fS when the intermediate input is produced in the South and fN when it is produced in the North.
The experiments are fS = {2.05, 2, 1.95} and fN = {1.08, 1, 0.92}, respectively. The results in
Figure 7 show that the required fixed organizational cost to have the intermediate input produced
in the South is negatively correlated with the extent of FDI. As fS increases, the curve piS shifts
down uniformly, thus intersecting the schedule piN at a larger lower bound and a smaller upper
bound. Thus, a smaller range of intermediate firms undertake FDI in the first wave of migration.
The effect then propagates to the subsequent waves of migration. At steady state, a smaller range
of intermediate firms produce in the South that entails a higher fixed organizational cost. Figure 8
shows that the fixed organizational cost of having the intermediate input produced in the North
has exactly the opposite effect. As fN increases, a larger range of intermediate firms relocate their
production of intermediate inputs to the South in the first wave of migration. The trend continues
until the steady state.
Figure 9 demonstrates the effects of sectoral production technology, as reflected by the intensity
of headquarter service, on the extent of FDI. The experiments are η = {0.615, 0.6, 0.585}. The
results suggest that as the intensity of headquarter service increases, fewer intermediate firms
will undertake FDI. This is because the reduction in the variable cost by producing in the South
becomes less important when the intermediate input is a smaller proportion of the final product
(ψS/ψN = wN (1−η)
α
1−α decreases as η increases).
Next, recall that the contract between the headquarter and the component supplier is non-
enforceable ex post. Given this institutional constraint, Figures 10–11 indicate that if the head-
quarter is more powerful in terms of either its ability to appropriate the intermediate input when
the ex post negotiation fails (δ), or its ability to extract from the ex post surplus (β), the extent of
FDI in the South will be smaller. This is because when the headquarter has the upper hand in the
dealing with the component supplier, the distortion of underinvestment by the component supplier
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will be larger, and the significance of variable cost saving by producing in the South relatively
smaller. As a result, the extent of FDI will be smaller at the steady state. [check]
Figure 12 illustrates the effects of sectoral demand condition α on the extent of FDI. With a
larger α, the demand elasticity for the product σ = 11−α is larger. Thus, the saving in variable
cost by producing in the South becomes more important. This is also reflected by the fact that
ψS/ψN = wN (1−η)
α
1−α increases as α increases. In this case, a higher α will lead to a wider range
of intermediate firms undertaking FDI in the first wave of migration, as shown in Figure 12. As a
result, the extent of FDI is also larger at the steady state. [add discussions of Figure 13]
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a dynamic theoretical model of FDI with firm heterogeneity in produc-
tivity. We show that with the presence of FDI uncertainty, firms with intermediate productivity
levels will undertake FDI ahead of firms in the lower tier and upper tier of productivity levels. This
is contrary to the results of Antra`s and Helpman (2004) where FDI propensity rises with firm pro-
ductivity. Given a first wave of industry migration, we then demonstrate the magnet effect of FDI,
where the presence of some FDI in the South creates positive externality for the later comers by
reducing the general uncertainty. This triggers a second wave of industry migration; a wider range
of intermediate firms now find it profitable to produce in the South. The enlarged mass of firms
located in the South further reduce FDI uncertainty and attract a third wave of migration. The
process continues until the power of the magnet effect reaches its steady state and an equilibrium
structure of international specialization emerges.
We conduct simulations to study the effects of several key parameters on the equilibrium struc-
ture of international production. We find that the extent of FDI undertaken by firms from the
North (measured by the range of productivity levels of the intermediate firms) is positively cor-
related with the level of infrastructure in the South, the fixed organizational cost of producing in
the North, and the demand elasticity for a product. On the other hand, it is negatively correlated
with the economic distance between the North and the South, the fixed organizational cost of pro-
ducing in the South, the intensity of headquarter service, and the relative bargaining power of the
headquarter versus the component supplier. As the relative wage of the North increases, however,
15
both the lower bound and the upper bound of migrated firms shift up.
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Figure 1: Firm Productivity and FDI Timing: FDI in China by Taiwanese Firms
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between the timing that a Taiwanese firm under-
takes its first FDI in mainland China and its productivity. The timing is measured as the
number of quarters elapsed since the Taiwanese government lifted the ban in 1991, and the
productivity of a firm is measured by the ratio of Return on Assets. We take the average
of the ratios for a firm between 1991 and 1993. The data source is described in the text.
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Figure 2: piS(θ˜, z) as z varies
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Figure 3: Magnet Effect of FDI
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Figure 4: Effects of K on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 5: Effects of d on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 6: Effects of wN on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 7: Effects of fS on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 8: Effects of fN on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 9: Effects of η on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 10: Effects of δ on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 11: Effects of β on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 12: Effects of α on the Speed and Range of FDI
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Figure 13: Effects of k on the Speed and Range of FDI
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